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Here in good old God-Save-America
The home of the brave and the free
We are all hopelessly oppressed cowards
Of some duality
Of reckless multiplicity ...
Joni Mitchell, "Don Juan's Reckless Daughter"1
In periods when there is little self-consciousness
about the artificial character of all categories,
even a legal thinker who knows she is engaged
in a major effort to redefine the structure
may have no idea how much choice is
implicit in her activity.
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries'
Norman Rosenberg's treatment of Thomas Cooley, liberal
jurisprudence, and the law of libelP exemplifies both a difficulty
with and an opportunity for traditional law review scholarship.
The difficulty arises from the failure of many legal writers to
identify and explain the jurisprudential perspectives that define
their substantive approach. This problem is particularly acute
when, as in Professor Rosenberg's article, the jurisprudential
perspective deviates from the mainstream. The opportunity lies
in bringing the problem of perspective out of the closet and
legitimating its critical treatment as an integral element of all
legal scholarship - most especially that scholarship which
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3. Rosenberg, Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, and the Law of Libel,
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engages in substantive analysis rather than that which delves
into jurisprudence as some distinct and distant luxury.
This opportunity is especially alluring today, as we witness
"a major jurisprudential paradigm shift [away] from the legal
realist-legal positivist paradigm of the legal official as a manage-
rial technocrat ideally seeking the utilitarian goal of the greatest
happiness of the greatest number."" Rejection of the positivist
model, which has influenced American legal thought since its
inception5 and dominated American jurisprudence during this
century,6 carries profound implications. What is occurring is not
merely the evolution of one movement into the next within the
positivist tradition; we witness more than a reaction to Process
Jurisprudence which reacted to Legal Realism which reacted to
Sociological Jurisprudence which reacted to Mechanical Juris-
prudence.7 Rather, this rejection steps outside the very con-
sciousness of positivism, compelling American legal thinkers to
respond to the exciting and frankly scary need to reformulate
their guiding conceptualizations of the law. We face a time of
choice.
Some choose to respond by advocating a return to that con-
sciousness which preceded positivism and competed with it dur-
ing America's first century: the consciousness of natural law, a
jurisprudence protective of individual human rights. Professor
Richards' assertion of a "major jurisprudential paradigm shift"
entailed not only a rejection of the positivist paradigm, but also
his identification of the "natural law paradigm of rights" as the
model to which legal philosophy is shifting.8 Professor Richards
is in good company. Other scholars who champion a normative,
rights-oriented perspective of law include Ronald Dworkin and
John Rawls.9
The goal of rebuilding a normative moral foundation for law
4. Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change
and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 295 (1979). See also
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 828 (1979).
5. Hart, The Shell Foundation Lectures, 1978-1979 Utilitarianism and Natural
Rights, 53 TuL. L. Rav. 663 (1979).
6. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977); E. PuRcEL, THE
CmsIs oF DEMocRATIC THEORY 74-94, 158-78 (1973).
7. See Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal History, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REv.
722, 723 (1980) (G. WHrrE, PATreRNs o AmcAN LEGAL THOUGHT).
8. Richards, supra note 4, at 295.
9. See R. DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEmOUSLY (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF Jus-
TIcE (1971).
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is admirable, but a return to the natural law paradigm smacks of
retreat. As H.L.A. Hart has observed: "I do not think a satisfac-
tory foundation for a theory of rights will be found as long as
the search is conducted in the shadow of utilitarianism. 0
Hart's observation forces us to question whether, in our rejection
of positivism, we can ignore the similar rejection of natural law
that originally led to positivism. Can we simply erase the criti-
cisms of natural law that have embedded themselves in our legal
consciousness? 1 An increasing number of American legal think-
ers think not. Eschewing the rigidity of an unrealistic natural
law orientation as well as the moral corruption of positivism, a
discernible group of scholars has turned to a third sort of legal
epistemology."' Professor Rosenberg belongs to this third group,
and his treatment of Thomas Cooley should be read with a rec-
ognition of its perspective.
The emergence of this perspective in a growing body of
literature is characterized by a self-conscious reliance on the
methods of the European social theorists to demonstrate both
the death of classical liberalism, especially as manifested in the
Western capitalist state, and the requisites for any epistemology
designed to replace liberalism.13 Social theory may be described
as:
the study of society whose characteristic features began to
appear in the writings of Montesquieu, his contemporaries, and
successors and which reached a sort of culmination in the
10. Hart, supra note 4, at 846.
11. Can we, for instance, return to a consciousness that accepts pre-Revolutionary
English common law as dispositive of most questions not governed by legislation?
This [view] was, of course, a natural consequence of the belief, firmly held by
all colonial legal theorists, that the English common law was declaratory of the
law of nature. As it was put by Joseph Quincy, common law rules were
"'founded in principles, that are permanent, uniform and universal.'"
McClain, Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz's The
Transformation of American Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 382, 383-84 (1980).
12. Many of these scholars may be identified as members of the Conference on Crit-
ical Legal Studies. See Lavine, Legal Scholars with a Social Conscience, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
7, 1980, at 13. Lavine's description posits a relationship between the Conference and
legal realism; to the extent that both the members of the Conference and many New
Deal realists exemplify a social reform orientation, the relationship may exist, but the
empirical methods of the latter certainly differ from the social theory approaches of the
former. Compare E. PURCELL, supra note 6, with text accompanying notes 12-14 infra
(description of social theory). See also T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFic REVOLU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1970).
13. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 209-21; R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY
192-223 (1976).
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works of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. It first established its
identity by contrast to the political thought of the ancients and
the Schoolmen. Two features chiefly distinguish it from the
earlier tradition: one has to do with its conception of its own
aim and method; and the other with a view of the relation
between human nature and history....
The political philosophy of the ancients was at once
descriptive and prescriptive. . . .[T]he method employed by
the traditional theory was one to which the distinction between
fact and value, descriptive and evaluation, was largely, though
not wholly, alien.
The contrasts of fact and value, of science and moral judg-
ment, and therefore also of law in the descriptive and the pre-
scriptive sense are among the main themes in the tradition of
social theory....
A [second] major feature of the outlook against which
the classical social theorists rebelled was the notion that there
is a universal human nature, common to all men, regardless of
their place in history ...
... [S]ocial theory is engaged in a quest for an under-
standing of the different forms that people's awareness of each
other, of nature, and of themselves assume in each kind of
social life.
...If classical social theory has a unity, it is the unity of
a common predicament rather than that of a shared doctrine,
an agenda of puzzles raised and left partly unresolved.1 4
Among the variants of social theory reflected in current
American legal scholarship, two related and frequently overlap-
ping methods seem to dominate. One analyzes fundamental con-
tradictions or antinomies in a dialectic fashion; the other studies
structural relationships and their transformations into new
configurations.
Duncan Kennedy's recent dissection of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, for example, is built around a dialectic analysis of the
"fundamental contradiction" inherent in the belief "that the
14. R. UNoER, supra note 13, at 3-7. While positivism similarly posits a distinction
between fact and value, and generally recognizes no universal human nature, its descrip-
tive focus evades issues of prescriptive substantive justice as well as the relationships
among values, history, and the different forms of social organization. Compare, e.g., J.
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 5-32 (1977), with Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of
American Law, 1978 MARxisT PzRsPEcTins 96 and UNGER, supra note 13, at 203-16.
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goal of the individual freedom is at the same time dependent
upon and incompatible with the communal coercive action that
is necessary to achieve it."16 Roberto Unger's brilliant works
similarly analyze a myriad of conflicting visions of reason and
desire, rules and purposes, formality and solidarity, objectivity
and subjectivity. 6 Professor Rosenberg's treatment of Thomas
Cooley's libel decisions likewise traces the dilemmas faced by
that jurist to "contradictions within the liberal marketplace view
of free expression. 1 7 Each of these authors employs a dialectic
analysis of binary opposites to demonstrate the unsatisfactory
nature of the dualistic positions they are studying as well as set
the conditions for appropriate alternatives.
The transformation of binary oppositions is also central to
structuralism,1 8 the other dominant strain of social theory found
in the new American jurisprudence.
Structuralism ... represents an attempt to discover the ele-
ments and relationship of elements which provide the bases for
some practice or expression that is under study. The struc-
turalist theorist observes variations in the relationship of these
elements of expression and practice, which he attempts to
explain by specifying rules by which one element can be trans-
formed into another. Structural analysis, in seeking to discover
patterns of regularity in what seem to be incommensurable
particular phenomena, thus seeks to simplify the mass of data
that constitutes experience and at the same time to confirm
the existence of laws governing the variety of experience under
examination. ""
Leading European structuralists include Jean Piaget, a French
psychologist, and Claude Levi-Strauss, a French anthropolo-
gist.2 0 Reliance on structural analysis also may be found in the
legal history of Morton Horwitz,21 the constitutional law of Law-
rence Tribe, 2 and the labor law of Karl Klare2
15. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 211. See also Kennedy, Form and Substance in Pri-
vate Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
16. See generally R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SociETY (1976); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1975).
17. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 50.
18. See Hermann, Structuralist Approach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
1131, 1145, 1150-60 (1975).
19. Id. at 1143.
20. Id. at 1133.
21. See M. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
22. See Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 237 (1978);
19801
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The close relationship between the dialectic study of contra-
dictions and the structural analysis of transformation is appar-
ent in the writings of Mark Tushnet, an organizer of the Confer-
ence on Critical Legal Studies24 whose approach displays a
reliance on both.25 Similarly, Duncan Kennedy's critique of
Blackstone borrows from the second tradition as much as the
first.26 Moreover, both strains of social theory, in their identifica-
tion and use of legal paradigms, may claim a kinship with phi-
losophies of thought that reach beyond the social sciences to
include the natural sciences.2 7
Despite this apparent unity of social theory in both the
social and natural sciences, "it is difficult to discover even the
outline of a single doctrine in the writings of the classical social
theorists. . . . [Olne finds disagreement among the moderns on
almost every decisive point."' 8 Nowhere is such divergence more
apparent than in the writings of American legal thinkers who
rely on the methods of social theory. The lack of consistency
results chiefly from dramatically differing approaches to the
interplay between law and economics. The question appears to
be whether reliance on the social theory tradition entails open
acceptance of Marxist economics.
Although the American social theorists seem united in their
unwillingness to be tied to Western capitalism, they diverge on
the degree with which they embrace alternate economic systems
in their jurisprudence. Professor Tushnet's use of social theory
cannot be divorced from his advocacy of Marxist economics.29
By contrast, Professors Kennedy and Horwitz employ Marxist
methodologies as tools of critical analysis without openly
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 269 (1975).
23. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of the
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
24. See note 12 supra.
25. See Tushnet, supra note 14; Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way:
An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307
(1979).
26. Aside from Professor Kennedy's obvious reference to structuralism in his title,
and his tribute to both traditions in the list of works that influenced him most, one
should compare his use of the concept of mediation with Professor Hermann's descrip-
tion of structuralism. Compare Kennedy, supra note 2, at 210 n.2, 217-19, 256-72, 368-
72, 379-82, with Hermann, supra note 18, at 1153-59.
27. For one use of legal paradigms, see Kennedy, supra note 2, at 363-72. For a
brilliant description of the role of paradigms in modern scientific epistemology, see T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
28. R. Unger, supra note 13, at 7.
29. See Tushnet, supra note 14.
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embracing utopian Marxist economics as a prescriptive vision."
Professor Tribe's reliance on structural analysis is even fur-
ther removed from endorsement of Marxist economics. In fact,
he counsels against tying law to any form of economics when he
articulates the premises for his "metatheory of free speech":
It should be clear that no satisfactory theory of free speech
can presuppose or guarantee the permanent existence of any
particular social system. For example, a free speech theory
must permit evolution from a society built on the ideals of lib-
eral individualism to a society aspiring to more communitarian
visions - just as it must permit evolution from communitari-
anism to individualism. It is of course possible, and indeed it
may be common, to disregard the dangers of excessive parochi-
alism and to design theories slanted toward favored concep-
tions of society; and surely some less than universal social
vision must underlie any theory of law. But any free speech
theory too narrowly conceived must either admit of its own
self-destruction, as the evolution triggered by speech itself
undermines the social forms the theory presupposes; or it must
contain boundaries of a highly troublesome sort: boundaries
that proscribe as beyond the pale communicative acts that
threaten to transform society beyond the limits of its starting
premises.
As a corollary of this criterion of breadth, it follows that a
theory of free speech should not be too confined by the
assumptions of any particular form of economic life. . . . Any
theory built exclusively on the assumptions of capitalism - or
of any other economic system - must therefore be rejected as
too narrow.
•.. [A] limit on the criterion of breadth to which a free
speech theory must be held is the criterion of reality. One who
believes that it would be desirable to break down the capitalist
structure of profit and exploitation cannot pretend, in the
course of constructing a theory of free speech, that the struc-
ture has already been broken down. . ..
More generally, a theorist who aspires to a less coercive
form of social and economic life than ours must avoid the mis-
take of wishing coercion out of existence in designing a body of
first amendment theory. Paradoxically, the voice of the exploi-
ter must be heard before the transformation to a less coercive
30. See generally Kennedy, supra note 2; M. HoRwrrz, supra note 21.
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society may occur."1
The distance Professor Tribe accordingly puts between him-
self and the economic systems frequently associated with Euro-
pean social theory pique Professor Tushnet's ire. His recent cri-
tique of Tribe's well-known constitutional law treatises2 is aptly
entitled Dia-Tribe;ss in it Tushnet points his dialectic cannon at
the treatise "with the aim of showing that its premises are hope-
lessly contradictory."'" Labeling Tribe a Burkean conservative,8"
Tushnet engages in self-proclaimed "Tribe-trashing."" If his
conclusion, which attacks Tribe's "ambition" and brands his
treatise as a "corruption, '3 7 seems unduly personal, then it only
reinforces Unger's observations concerning the lack of consensus
among social theorists.38
Indeed, given Professor Unger's devastating criticism of
both the welfare-corporate state and the revolutionary socialist
state in postliberal society, " the admiration Tushnet displays
for Unger is somewhat puzzling. 0  Unger's treatment of
postliberal socialism unmasks its "unwillingness to subject soci-
ety and nature to ruthless and radical manipulation," 1 reveals
its "assertion of the primacy of collective bonds over individual
interests,' 4 and notes its demand of "complete devotion to
one's role in present society." 3 This treatment of socialism's
attempt "to reconcile industrialism, bureaucratization, and
national power with the achievement of an ideal of fraternal or
equalitarian community"" demonstrates the "schizophrenia" of
revolutionary socialism as constantly fluctuating "between par-
ticipation and centralism," torn "between the trials of its pre-
sent and the image of its future.'4
5
31. Tribe, Metatheory, supra note 22, at 239-41.
32. L. TmBE, AmEmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
33. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 (1980) (L. TRIBE, AmER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW).
34. ld.
35. See id. at 695, 705, 707-08.
36. Id. at 709.
37. Id. at 710.
38. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
39. See R. Unger, supra note 13, at 193-203, 231-34.
40. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 103.
41. R. Unger, supra note 13, at 231.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 231-32.
44. Id. at 231.
45. Id. at 232-33.
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Perhaps Tushnet's esteem for Unger stems from a recogni-
tion of the latter's rather unique role among the new social theo-
rists. Professor Unger's Knowledge and Politics and Law in
Modern Society avoid parochialism and achieve a breadth of
perspective that transcends both law and economics, enabling
the author to present a comprehensive application of social the-
ory to the legal order. Yet its breadth is not what distinguishes
Unger's work; rather, what makes his work unique is his willing-
ness to turn the critique of social theory against itself. Using the
tools of critical analysis first developed by the Europeans, Pro-
fessor Unger asserts that a resolution of the problems those
methods are designed to answer requires "a redefinition of the
very premises upon which social theory asserted its indepen-
dence" 4e from previous traditions of thought: "the contrast of
understanding and evaluation and the denial of a suprahistorical
human nature.' 7 This assertion relies not only upon a dialectic
treatment of antinomies, but also recognizes the inevitable role
that the individual structuralist plays in the analysis of contra-
dictory structures. In essence, Unger sees that the analyst's con-
sciousness is an important determinant of and limitation upon
the analysis itself. He concludes: "To carry out its own program,
social theory must destroy itself."' 8
Whether social theory in fact will self-destruct when its
methods are employed to analyze specific substantive issues
remains to be seen. This brief introduction to Professor Rosen-
berg's article obviously was intended neither as a description nor
an evaluation of its contents,'4 but instead as a mechanism to
facilitate the reader's evaluation of an analysis performed in the
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Despite this disclaimer, I commend Professor Rosenberg for his willingness to
engage in the analysis of a specific substantive area; too many of the works relying on
social theory avoid rigorous treatment of particular areas of the law, leaving the reader
stimulated on a theoretical level but unsatisfied with respect to the applicability of social
theory to the more focused disputes facing practicing lawyers on an everyday basis. The
dialogue between theory and technique, generality and specificity, plays a role in social
theory that is perhaps even more important than the role it played in the previous tradi-
tions of positivism and natural law. Indeed, if a "new jurisprudence" is the goal of criti-
cal social theorists, then they must move even further beyond the descriptive character
of the bulk. of their work and begin to generate specific prescriptions. Cf. Tushnet,
Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in
the Seventies, 57 Tsx. L. Rav. 1307, 1344-45 (1979); Gabel, Intention and Structure in
Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MiNN. L.
Rsv. 601 (1977).
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tradition of the social theorists. Placing that analysis in an epis-
temological context hopefully brings the question of jurispru-
dential perspective out of the closet while familiarizing the
reader with the emergence of an important trend in American
legal thought. The future of that trend presents exciting pros-
pects for those of us left unconvinced by past traditions. Our
obligation to respond to the various crises posited by the new
American social theorists requires us to fashion a new legal order
utilizing better tools for analysis.
It is an obligation not to be taken lightly. As novelist Tom
Robbins recently wrote:
In terms of hazardous vectors released, the transformation of
ideas into dogma rivals the transformation of hydrogen into
helium, uranium into lead, or innocence into corruption. And it
is nearly as relentless.
The problem starts at the secondary level, not with the
originator or developer of the idea but with the people who are
attracted by it, who adopt it, who cling to it until their last nail
breaks, and who invariably lack the overview, flexibility, imagi-
nation, and, most importantly, sense of humor, to maintain it
in the spirit in which it was hatched. Ideas are made by mas-
ters, dogma by disciples, and the Buddha is always killed on
the road.50
Let us avoid the novelist's trap and remain masters of our ideas
as we transform them into realities.
50. T. ROBBINS, STILL LIFE WITH WOODPECKER 85-86 (1980).
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